FIRE PROTECTION DEVICES COMMITTEE
MEETING MINUTES
Woodland, California
February 26, 1999
| Martin VanRaesfeld, Santa Clara FD Angela Sullivan, Santa Clara FD John Gillilan, CAFAA Robert Evans, Stockton FD Ben Lehr, Honeywell Building Controls Vern Canon, Nevada County Consol. FD Linda Brandelius, Roseville FD Weston Arvin, UC Davis FD Steve Hart, Anybody's Guess Rick Mueller, MH Chew & Associates Clayton Jolley, Half Moon Bay FD Mario McArn, Stockton FD Kent Miller, Stockton FD |
Basil Holcomb, Santa Rosa FD Robert Macliyro, Santa Rosa FD Jeff Tarter, Integrated Engineering Service Terri Leyton, Central Sprinkler company Bill Sallee, System Sensor Jim Dalton, NSFA Franz Hauz, WRSBO Scott Moon, Petaluma FD David Secoda, Bay Alarm Company David Reade, Monterey FD Luis Da Silva, San Jose FD Mark Hollan, Fairfield FD Lynn Trickle, Napa FD |
CARBON DIOXIDE ACCIDENT VIDEO
Robert Gall showed the group a video which analyzed a carbon dioxide accident at the Idaho National Engineering Lab. One person was killed and four persons were injured at Building 648 on July 28, 1998. Since 1975, 68 persons worldwide have died and 89 have been injured in CO2 accidents.
A 13-person crew had scheduled cleaning of a 4160-volt switch gear that was last cleaned and serviced in 1994. To minimize the down time, the entire building was deenergized and the emergency diesel generator was shut off.
Although the reactor had been taken out of service a number of years before, the existing CO2 protection system was left in place. This protection system, according to the video, may not have been needed.
A total CO2 white-out occurred when the last switch gear breaker was opened. A voltage spike caused the new 1997 UL listed release panel to activate the system without a predischarge evacuation signal. Control heads on the CO2 cylinders did not have positive lockout as required by OSHA. Unable to see, and with aisles blocked with breakers, cabinets and temporary lighting, five persons became trapped and one died. Engineers were later able to simulate this accident and cause the panel to release with a voltage jump.
The video listed several items that contributed to the accident:
Inadequate search and response team (cut by funding)
Inadequate SCBA gear (also cut by funding)
Pressure switches missing from the CO2 system equipment
Inadequate oxygen for the victims
Inadequate work planning and control
Congestion in the aisle ways
Failure to lock out the CO2 system
If you have total flooding CO2 systems in your jurisdiction, it would be worth reviewing NFPA 12, 1998 Edition, to see if safety standards are being met. Certainly, contact Robert Gall at (925) 423-2304, if you would like more information.
DUCT DETECTORS (AGAIN)
Dave Secode from Bay Alarm asked for clarification of the fire alarm requirements for duct detectors. This inquiry takes us to Section 608 of the Mechanical Code which asks for supervision of the detectors under certain circumstances. Believe it or not, Wes and I were preparing to deal with this topic once more until Wednesday, March 3, 1999, when I took Bill Hoppleµs 1996 NFPA 72 class in Vacaville.
At this class I learned that the text in the 1998 California Mechanical Code, which becomes effective July 1, 1999, has changed considerably. The language, in my opinion, is vague enough to have more than one interpretation---something about "causing the fire alarm system to activate." The 1998 California Fire Code, adopts NFPA 72, 1996 Edition. However, it includes a number of amendments. One section that was not amended is NFPA 72 5-10.4.1. It states:
"To prevent the recirculation of dangerous quantities of smoke, a detector approved for air duct use shall be installed on the supply side of air-handling systems as required by NFPA 90A. Standard for the Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating System, and . . . "
NFPA 90A, 1996 Edition, Section 4-4.4.2 states ". . . so that the activation of any air distribution system smoke detector causes a supervisory signal to be indicated at a constantly attended location or causes an alarm signal."
One person asked which standard supersedes the California Mechanical Code or NFPA 90A. This committee will try to find a practical solution to the duct detector issue. Perhaps we can develop a checklist or guideline.
A2.1 OCCUPANCIES ARE NOW 1,000 PERSONS OR MORE
The 1998 California Fire Code Section 1007.2.2.2 now states that Group A occupancies with an occupancy load of 1,000 or more need to have a voice communication system. Bill Hopple informed Manny Muniz, who was in the room, that this should have been corrected to 300 persons. If this fails to be corrected by July 1, 1999, you may want to prepare a local ordinance to correct the language. This also applies to other errors you may find in the new code. However, anything you find which relates to California Fire Code amendment to NFPA 72, 1996 Edition, please contact Manny Muniz. He would like to be informed of your concerns since is he a consultant to the fire alarm industry and is working with the Office of the State Fire Marshal. He is available at (916) 989-3193 or Fax (916) 989-1493.
Respectively submitted,
ROBERT EVANS, CO-CHAIR, WESTON ALVIN, CO-CHAIR
FIRE PROTECTION DEVICES COMMITTEE
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